State of California (Department of Personnel Administration) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2081-S (Issued on 11/24/09)
This case involved an appeal from a dismissal. The California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) alleged that the State committed an unfair practice by insisting to impasse on a permissive subject of bargaining. Specifically, CCPOA asserted that the State included several provisions in its last, best and final offer that constituted waivers of employee rights. For example, the State proposed a continuance of a contract provision whereby CCPOA agreed that it would not directly bring an action against the State for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Board agent dismissed the charge on the ground that CCPOA failed to make known its objections to the State’s proposals on such permissive subjects of bargaining.
On appeal, the Board affirmed the well-established rule that a party may not legally insist upon the acceptance of a proposal involving a permissive subject of bargaining "in the face of a clear and express refusal by the union to bargain" over them. (Citing to Lake Elsinore School District (1986) PERB Decision No. 603.) However, the Board held that its precedent also established that the party objecting to a non-mandatory subject “clearly communicate its opposition to further consideration of the proposal.” Once a party makes its objection clear, the party proposing the non-mandatory subject of bargaining may not insist to impasse on it.
Here, CCPOA asserted that its response to that State that, “YOUR CURRENT PROPOSAL HAS SEVERAL SECTIONS THAT REQUIRE US TO AGREE TO WAIVE STATE LAW FOR OUR MEMBERS. THAT IS NOT A LEGITIMATE EFFORT TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT” placed the State on notice of the union’s objection. The Board disagreed, finding that such a response and CCPOA’s other actions failed to communicate “clear opposition” to the State’s permissive proposals. Accordingly, the Board affirmed the dismissal.
Comments:
This is not a ground-breaking case, but a good reminder that if you don’t want to negotiate over permissive subjects of bargaining you must clearly say so.
The reality is, however, that most permissive subjects of bargaining find their way into contracts as the quid pro quo for a mandatory subject of bargaining. Most employers also realize that you can’t insist to impasse on a permissive subject of bargaining. However, nothing prevents an employer from offering something “extra” in exchange for agreement on a permissive subject as long as the employer continues to bargain in good faith over other mandatory subjects. That’s how most permissive subjects are bargained.
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Monday, December 7, 2009
PERB: Complaint Must Issue on Union's Violation of DFR
IBEW Local 1245 (Flowers) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2079-M (Issued on 11/24/09)
Of the 35 Board decisions issued so far this year, 9 have been brought against unions alleging a violation of the duty of fair representation. That's not unusual as DFR cases typically make up 25% of the Board's caseload. In eight of the cases this year, the Board affirmed the dismissal of the unfair practice charge. In IBEW Local 1245 (Flowers), the Board actually overturned the Board agent’s dismissal. Getting a complaint issued on a DFR charge is not easy, so I thought this case was worth highlighting.
There are not a lot of facts. The employee was terminated from his employment. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the employee’s right to challenge his termination through arbitration was controlled by the union. The union filed a grievance on the employee’s behalf. However, the employee never heard from the union again until a few months later when a union representative called the employee and said that union would not take the case to arbitration. The union representative offered no explanation.
Under these facts, the Board held that the employee had stated a prima facie violation of the duty of fair representation. First, the Board held that it could be inferred from the facts as alleged that the union did not undertake any investigation or evaluation into the merits of the employee’s case. Second, the Board affirmed that the DFR requires a union to offer the employee an explanation as to why it will not elevate a case to arbitration. Here, the union allegedly failed to provide such an explanation. Accordingly, the Board overturned the dismissal and ordered a complaint to be issued.
Comments:
1. The facts in this case are unusual as most unions are acutely aware of their DFR obligations. As long as a union does its due diligence and makes an informed decision about whether to take a case to arbitration, getting a DFR complaint issued is virtually impossible. So congrats to Steve Bassoff for getting the Board to issue a complaint.
2. However, the employee should not start celebrating just because a complaint has issued. The hard part is still ahead: the employee has to actually prove a violation of the DFR. Undoubtedly, the union will come into the hearing and provide an explanation as to why it did not take the case to arbitration. However, does that cure the fact that the union didn't provide that explanation to the employee at the time? In my mind it shouldn't. However, even if it doesn't what's the remedy? That's the problem with the current DFR jurisprudence - in the extremely rare instance where an employee can actually prove a DFR violation the remedy almost always falls short of making the employee whole. Hopefully, given the right case, the Board will address this issue sometime in the future.
Of the 35 Board decisions issued so far this year, 9 have been brought against unions alleging a violation of the duty of fair representation. That's not unusual as DFR cases typically make up 25% of the Board's caseload. In eight of the cases this year, the Board affirmed the dismissal of the unfair practice charge. In IBEW Local 1245 (Flowers), the Board actually overturned the Board agent’s dismissal. Getting a complaint issued on a DFR charge is not easy, so I thought this case was worth highlighting.
There are not a lot of facts. The employee was terminated from his employment. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the employee’s right to challenge his termination through arbitration was controlled by the union. The union filed a grievance on the employee’s behalf. However, the employee never heard from the union again until a few months later when a union representative called the employee and said that union would not take the case to arbitration. The union representative offered no explanation.
Under these facts, the Board held that the employee had stated a prima facie violation of the duty of fair representation. First, the Board held that it could be inferred from the facts as alleged that the union did not undertake any investigation or evaluation into the merits of the employee’s case. Second, the Board affirmed that the DFR requires a union to offer the employee an explanation as to why it will not elevate a case to arbitration. Here, the union allegedly failed to provide such an explanation. Accordingly, the Board overturned the dismissal and ordered a complaint to be issued.
Comments:
1. The facts in this case are unusual as most unions are acutely aware of their DFR obligations. As long as a union does its due diligence and makes an informed decision about whether to take a case to arbitration, getting a DFR complaint issued is virtually impossible. So congrats to Steve Bassoff for getting the Board to issue a complaint.
2. However, the employee should not start celebrating just because a complaint has issued. The hard part is still ahead: the employee has to actually prove a violation of the DFR. Undoubtedly, the union will come into the hearing and provide an explanation as to why it did not take the case to arbitration. However, does that cure the fact that the union didn't provide that explanation to the employee at the time? In my mind it shouldn't. However, even if it doesn't what's the remedy? That's the problem with the current DFR jurisprudence - in the extremely rare instance where an employee can actually prove a DFR violation the remedy almost always falls short of making the employee whole. Hopefully, given the right case, the Board will address this issue sometime in the future.
Sunday, November 8, 2009
City Not Required to Implement Last, Best, Final Offer
City of Clovis (2009) PERB Decision No. 2074-M (Issued on 10/30/09)
This case involved an allegation by the Clovis Public Works Employees' Affiliation (Union) that the City of Clovis committed an unfair practice by refusing to implement its last, best, and final offer of a three percent wage increase.
Facts:
The parties began negotiations on a wage re-opener in May 2007. After multiple bargaining sessions the parties were unsuccessful in reaching agreement. On July 13, 2007, the City proffered its last, best, and final offer of a three percent salary increase, effective July 1, 2007. On July 17, 2007, the Union rejected the offer and declared impasse. After unsuccessful mediation attempts the parties resumed negotiations but made no progress. On September 28, 2007, the Union’s chief negotiator sent a letter to the City's chief negotiator stating that the City's proposal had been voted down by the membership and the Union again declared impasse. Soon thereafter the Union also informed the City that it intended to file an unfair practice charge.
The Union’s chief negotiator assumed that the City would implement its last, best, and final offer of a three percent salary increase. However, by late January 2008, the City had not implemented the three percent wage increase. On February 1, 2008, after discussions with union membership, the Union’s chief negotiator left the City’s chief negotiator a message stating that the Union would dismiss the pending unfair practice charge if the City would implement the three percent salary increase contained in its last, best, and final offer.
At the PERB hearing, the City’s chief negotiator testified that he understood the Union’s proposal to be nothing more than a settlement offer of the unfair practice charge. However, based on the facts described above the ALJ found that the Union’s message was an acceptance of the City’s last, best and final offer and therefore created a binding agreement between the parties. Because the City didn't implement the offer, the ALJ concluded that the City committed an unfair practice.
The Board’s Decision
For the first time this year (2009-2010), the Board rejected the ALJ’s proposed decision. First, the Board noted that under MMBA section 3505.4, once an impasse has been properly reached between the parties, a public agency "may implement its last, best, and final offer." (Emphasis added.) The Board held that this provision is permissive, not mandatory. Therefore the City was under no obligation to implement its last, best, and final offer at impasse.
Next, the Board found that the evidence at hearing was inadequate to establish an unconditional acceptance of the City’s offer. More importantly, the Board held that even if the Union had validly accepted the City's last, best, and final offer, that alone did not create a binding and enforceable agreement under the MMBA. This is because MMBA section 3505.1 requires that any agreement be reduced to writing and ratified by the City Council before it becomes binding on the parties. Accordingly, the Board rejected the proposed decision and dismissed the complaint.
Comments:
1. The Board’s decision is absolutely correct. Because the Board rejected the ALJ’s decision, a copy of the proposed decision was not attached. You have to go to the “CA-PER” database in Westlaw to find the ALJ’s proposed decision. When you look at the ALJ’s proposed decision, you will see that the ALJ exclusively cited to private sector NLRB cases. But there is a huge difference between the NLRB and MMBA when it comes to the concept of who has the ultimate authority to bind the employer. Under NLRB precedent, it is potentially an unfair practice to send a negotiator who doesn’t have authority to bind the employer. However, under MMBA section 3505.1, it is plain that only the governing body of a local agency has the authority to ratify an agreement for the City. In the same way the union’s membership can reject a contract, a City Council or County Board of Supervisors can also reject a contract. Thus, the City's chief negotiator did not have the authority to "bind" the City in the manner the ALJ found.
2. This is (I believe) the first case under the MMBA that expressly affirms two very important principles. One, under the MMBA only the governing body of a local agency can bind the agency. As mentioned above, this is a critical difference between the MMBA and the NLRB, and to some extent even with the other public sector statutes. Second, the imposition of an employer’s last, best, and final offer is not mandatory, but rather permissive. Thus, where a union rejects an offer of a raise because it isn't enough, it bears the risk that the employer will choose not to implement any raise at all. Here, in retrospect, I'm sure the Union wishes it would have accepted the 3% offer back in 2007.
This case involved an allegation by the Clovis Public Works Employees' Affiliation (Union) that the City of Clovis committed an unfair practice by refusing to implement its last, best, and final offer of a three percent wage increase.
Facts:
The parties began negotiations on a wage re-opener in May 2007. After multiple bargaining sessions the parties were unsuccessful in reaching agreement. On July 13, 2007, the City proffered its last, best, and final offer of a three percent salary increase, effective July 1, 2007. On July 17, 2007, the Union rejected the offer and declared impasse. After unsuccessful mediation attempts the parties resumed negotiations but made no progress. On September 28, 2007, the Union’s chief negotiator sent a letter to the City's chief negotiator stating that the City's proposal had been voted down by the membership and the Union again declared impasse. Soon thereafter the Union also informed the City that it intended to file an unfair practice charge.
The Union’s chief negotiator assumed that the City would implement its last, best, and final offer of a three percent salary increase. However, by late January 2008, the City had not implemented the three percent wage increase. On February 1, 2008, after discussions with union membership, the Union’s chief negotiator left the City’s chief negotiator a message stating that the Union would dismiss the pending unfair practice charge if the City would implement the three percent salary increase contained in its last, best, and final offer.
At the PERB hearing, the City’s chief negotiator testified that he understood the Union’s proposal to be nothing more than a settlement offer of the unfair practice charge. However, based on the facts described above the ALJ found that the Union’s message was an acceptance of the City’s last, best and final offer and therefore created a binding agreement between the parties. Because the City didn't implement the offer, the ALJ concluded that the City committed an unfair practice.
The Board’s Decision
For the first time this year (2009-2010), the Board rejected the ALJ’s proposed decision. First, the Board noted that under MMBA section 3505.4, once an impasse has been properly reached between the parties, a public agency "may implement its last, best, and final offer." (Emphasis added.) The Board held that this provision is permissive, not mandatory. Therefore the City was under no obligation to implement its last, best, and final offer at impasse.
Next, the Board found that the evidence at hearing was inadequate to establish an unconditional acceptance of the City’s offer. More importantly, the Board held that even if the Union had validly accepted the City's last, best, and final offer, that alone did not create a binding and enforceable agreement under the MMBA. This is because MMBA section 3505.1 requires that any agreement be reduced to writing and ratified by the City Council before it becomes binding on the parties. Accordingly, the Board rejected the proposed decision and dismissed the complaint.
Comments:
1. The Board’s decision is absolutely correct. Because the Board rejected the ALJ’s decision, a copy of the proposed decision was not attached. You have to go to the “CA-PER” database in Westlaw to find the ALJ’s proposed decision. When you look at the ALJ’s proposed decision, you will see that the ALJ exclusively cited to private sector NLRB cases. But there is a huge difference between the NLRB and MMBA when it comes to the concept of who has the ultimate authority to bind the employer. Under NLRB precedent, it is potentially an unfair practice to send a negotiator who doesn’t have authority to bind the employer. However, under MMBA section 3505.1, it is plain that only the governing body of a local agency has the authority to ratify an agreement for the City. In the same way the union’s membership can reject a contract, a City Council or County Board of Supervisors can also reject a contract. Thus, the City's chief negotiator did not have the authority to "bind" the City in the manner the ALJ found.
2. This is (I believe) the first case under the MMBA that expressly affirms two very important principles. One, under the MMBA only the governing body of a local agency can bind the agency. As mentioned above, this is a critical difference between the MMBA and the NLRB, and to some extent even with the other public sector statutes. Second, the imposition of an employer’s last, best, and final offer is not mandatory, but rather permissive. Thus, where a union rejects an offer of a raise because it isn't enough, it bears the risk that the employer will choose not to implement any raise at all. Here, in retrospect, I'm sure the Union wishes it would have accepted the 3% offer back in 2007.
Sunday, October 25, 2009
PERB: Police Search Was Adverse Employment Action
Trustees of the California State University (San Marcos) (2009) PERB Dec. No. 2070-H (Issued on 10/15/09)
This case involved an appeal from a dismissal. The unfair practice charge alleged that the California State University (San Marcos) (“CSU”) violated the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA) by: (1) unilaterally transferring bargaining unit work to non-unit employees; and (2) retaliating against an employee for using union representation in a dispute over his work assignments. The Board agent dismissed both allegations for failure to state a prima facie case. The Board affirmed the dismissal of the allegation that CSU unlawfully transferred bargaining unit work. However, the Board reversed the dismissal on the retaliation charge.
With respect to the retaliation charge, the union alleged that one of its bargaining unit members, Rafael Lopez, was retaliated against for filing grievances and utilizing union representation. One of the issues PERB considered was whether the union established that Lopez suffered an adverse employment action. The unfair practice charge alleged that Lopez’ supervisor initiated a false complaint against him that resulted in Lopez’ car being searched by campus police.
In its decision, PERB noted that it had previously held that the filing of a citizen's complaint against an employee with the knowledge that it would lead to an investigation by the employer can constitute an adverse employment action. (California Union of Safety Employees (Coelho) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1032-S.) Here, the union alleged that Lopez’ supervisor filed a complaint with campus security claiming that Lopez had stolen state property. The complaint resulted in campus police searching Lopez' personal vehicle. Under these facts, PERB held that, “A reasonable person would be concerned about the effect of the search on his or her employment because it could lead to discipline, criminal charges, or both. Thus, despite the fact that Lopez was never disciplined or charged based on the search, we find the vehicle search was an adverse action.”
Comments:
This case caught my attention because of the report to campus police. The fact that the alleged adverse employment action was based on a police report should normally trigger the absolute protection of Civil Code section 47(b). Significantly, Section 47(b) was apparently not raised by the parties; or at least it was not addressed by PERB.
Section 47(b) establishes an absolute privilege for statements made during judicial proceedings. The courts have held that Section 47(b) “gives all persons the right to report crimes to the police, the local prosecutor or an appropriate regulatory agency, even if the report is made in bad faith.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350.) Section 47(b) has been held that bar all tort causes of action, except a claim for malicious prosecution, based on statements made in a judicial proceeding such as a report to law enforcement.
One of the key cases in this area is Brown v. Department of Corrections (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 520 (“Brown”). In Brown, an employee of the Department of Corrections filed a whistle-blower complaint under Labor Code section 1102.5 alleging that the department made a police report against him because of his whistleblower activities. The court held that the department’s report to the police was absolutely privileged under Section 47(b). While acknowledging the public policy underlying the whistleblower statute, the court nevertheless found that the “importance of providing to citizens free and open access to governmental agencies for the reporting of suspected illegal activity outweighs the occasional harm that might befall a defamed individual. Thus the absolute privilege is essential.”
Under Brown, the absolute privilege of Section 47(b) has been held to trump discrimination statutes. Similarly, I believe the statutory protections of HEERA must similarly yield to the absolute privilege of Section 47(b). While there is certainly a public policy in preventing retaliation against employees who participate in protected union conduct, that public policy cannot trump the policy in favor of promoting the reporting of crimes—even if made in bad faith—to law enforcement. Indeed, that’s exactly the point of the absolute privilege.
Thus, even though this decision is precedential, I believe that if the Section 47(b) defense is properly raised, PERB will have no choice but to recognize that a police report cannot form the basis of an adverse employment action.
This case involved an appeal from a dismissal. The unfair practice charge alleged that the California State University (San Marcos) (“CSU”) violated the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA) by: (1) unilaterally transferring bargaining unit work to non-unit employees; and (2) retaliating against an employee for using union representation in a dispute over his work assignments. The Board agent dismissed both allegations for failure to state a prima facie case. The Board affirmed the dismissal of the allegation that CSU unlawfully transferred bargaining unit work. However, the Board reversed the dismissal on the retaliation charge.
With respect to the retaliation charge, the union alleged that one of its bargaining unit members, Rafael Lopez, was retaliated against for filing grievances and utilizing union representation. One of the issues PERB considered was whether the union established that Lopez suffered an adverse employment action. The unfair practice charge alleged that Lopez’ supervisor initiated a false complaint against him that resulted in Lopez’ car being searched by campus police.
In its decision, PERB noted that it had previously held that the filing of a citizen's complaint against an employee with the knowledge that it would lead to an investigation by the employer can constitute an adverse employment action. (California Union of Safety Employees (Coelho) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1032-S.) Here, the union alleged that Lopez’ supervisor filed a complaint with campus security claiming that Lopez had stolen state property. The complaint resulted in campus police searching Lopez' personal vehicle. Under these facts, PERB held that, “A reasonable person would be concerned about the effect of the search on his or her employment because it could lead to discipline, criminal charges, or both. Thus, despite the fact that Lopez was never disciplined or charged based on the search, we find the vehicle search was an adverse action.”
Comments:
This case caught my attention because of the report to campus police. The fact that the alleged adverse employment action was based on a police report should normally trigger the absolute protection of Civil Code section 47(b). Significantly, Section 47(b) was apparently not raised by the parties; or at least it was not addressed by PERB.
Section 47(b) establishes an absolute privilege for statements made during judicial proceedings. The courts have held that Section 47(b) “gives all persons the right to report crimes to the police, the local prosecutor or an appropriate regulatory agency, even if the report is made in bad faith.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350.) Section 47(b) has been held that bar all tort causes of action, except a claim for malicious prosecution, based on statements made in a judicial proceeding such as a report to law enforcement.
One of the key cases in this area is Brown v. Department of Corrections (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 520 (“Brown”). In Brown, an employee of the Department of Corrections filed a whistle-blower complaint under Labor Code section 1102.5 alleging that the department made a police report against him because of his whistleblower activities. The court held that the department’s report to the police was absolutely privileged under Section 47(b). While acknowledging the public policy underlying the whistleblower statute, the court nevertheless found that the “importance of providing to citizens free and open access to governmental agencies for the reporting of suspected illegal activity outweighs the occasional harm that might befall a defamed individual. Thus the absolute privilege is essential.”
Under Brown, the absolute privilege of Section 47(b) has been held to trump discrimination statutes. Similarly, I believe the statutory protections of HEERA must similarly yield to the absolute privilege of Section 47(b). While there is certainly a public policy in preventing retaliation against employees who participate in protected union conduct, that public policy cannot trump the policy in favor of promoting the reporting of crimes—even if made in bad faith—to law enforcement. Indeed, that’s exactly the point of the absolute privilege.
Thus, even though this decision is precedential, I believe that if the Section 47(b) defense is properly raised, PERB will have no choice but to recognize that a police report cannot form the basis of an adverse employment action.
Friday, October 16, 2009
PERB Stops Strike in Palo Alto
On September 23, 2009, PERB sought and received a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the superior court prohibiting certain health and safety employees in the City of Palo Alto from engaging in a strike called by SEIU Local 521. That TRO applied to public safety dispatchers, water quality control operators, mechanics, and electrical workers, among other employee classifications. On October 15, 2009, the court issued a preliminary injunction, extending the injunction set forth in the TRO indefinitely. In the preliminary injunction, the court specifically found that:
“1. Plaintiff has established the probable validity of its claims and the probability that there is an immediate danger that Defendant SEIU will violate the Government Code by engaging in a strike or work stoppage. Failure to issue this Preliminary Injunction would result in an imminent threat to public health, safety and welfare.
2. This is a proper case for issuance of a Preliminary Injunction, and unless a Preliminary Injunction issues, the City of Palo Alto will face substantial and irreparable injury.”
Comments
This is only the second time this year that PERB has sought injunctive relief on behalf of a party. The first was back in July when PERB obtained a TRO against AFSCME Local 3299, prohibiting it from engaging in a strike against the University of California. Since then PERB has received several requests for injunctive relief, mainly by unions seeking to prevent employers from imposing last, best and final offers. To date, all those requests have been denied, presumably because PERB found no “irreparable harm" as any violation could be remedied later on.
In contrast, PERB has appeared willing to grant requests for injunctive relief when health and safety employees threaten to strike. In my opinion, this is as it should be. By definition, strikes by health and safety employees have the potential to cause irreparable harm to the general public. As such, these situations are tailor-made for PERB’s injunctive relief powers. Quite frankly, I still believe it would be more efficient and make more sense to allow public entities to go directly to superior court to seek injunctive relief, instead of having to detour to PERB first. However, I'm glad that PERB has acted aggressively in stopping these strikes.
“1. Plaintiff has established the probable validity of its claims and the probability that there is an immediate danger that Defendant SEIU will violate the Government Code by engaging in a strike or work stoppage. Failure to issue this Preliminary Injunction would result in an imminent threat to public health, safety and welfare.
2. This is a proper case for issuance of a Preliminary Injunction, and unless a Preliminary Injunction issues, the City of Palo Alto will face substantial and irreparable injury.”
Comments
This is only the second time this year that PERB has sought injunctive relief on behalf of a party. The first was back in July when PERB obtained a TRO against AFSCME Local 3299, prohibiting it from engaging in a strike against the University of California. Since then PERB has received several requests for injunctive relief, mainly by unions seeking to prevent employers from imposing last, best and final offers. To date, all those requests have been denied, presumably because PERB found no “irreparable harm" as any violation could be remedied later on.
In contrast, PERB has appeared willing to grant requests for injunctive relief when health and safety employees threaten to strike. In my opinion, this is as it should be. By definition, strikes by health and safety employees have the potential to cause irreparable harm to the general public. As such, these situations are tailor-made for PERB’s injunctive relief powers. Quite frankly, I still believe it would be more efficient and make more sense to allow public entities to go directly to superior court to seek injunctive relief, instead of having to detour to PERB first. However, I'm glad that PERB has acted aggressively in stopping these strikes.
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
10 New Employment Laws You Probably Haven't Heard Of . . .
Last week the Governor signed over two hundred bills and vetoed at least that many. Over the next few weeks, I’m sure we will all be receiving various bulletins describing the major new labor and employment laws in California. So instead of duplicating that effort, I decided to highlight 10 obscure new laws that affect public sector employment in California. Have fun reading.
1. AB 32 (D-Lieu) - Public officials: Personal Information.
Allows an elected or appointed official, or his or her employer, to obtain an injunction against any person or entity that publicly posts on the Internet the home address or telephone number of that official.
2. AB 381 (D-Block) - Unemployment Compensation Disability Benefits: Academic Employees. Allows community college districts to elect to provide state disability insurance (SDI) coverage to academic employees who are permanent, part-time, or temporary; and, to management, confidential, and employees who are not part of a bargaining unit.
3. AB 485 (D- Carter) - Civil Air Patrol: California Wing: Employment Leave.
Requires an employer to provide 10 days of unpaid leave to an employee called to service by the Civil Air Patrol. (Not just a public sector law)
4. AB 567 (R- Villines) - Government Practices.
Amends the California Whistleblower Protection Act (CWPA) to cover as “employees” those persons appointed to state boards or commissions
5. AB 681 (D- Hernandez) - Confidentiality of Medical Information: Psychotherapy.
Allows for the disclosure of confidential medical information (as opposed to a mere Tarasoff warning) by a psychotherapist when there is a serious imminent threat to the health and safety of a reasonably foreseeable victim or victims. Disclosure must be pursuant to a request for information from law enforcement or the target of the threat (which presumably would include employers and/or employees that are targeted). (Not just a public sector law)
6. AB 955 (D- León) - Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act: Discipline.
Amends the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act to clarify that a public agency is not be required to impose discipline within the one-year limitations period; only the investigation and notice of discipline must be completed within the year.
7. AB 1227 (D- Feuer) - Workers’ Compensation: Public Employees: Leaves of Absence.
Expands the availability of Labor Code 4850 leave—which allows injured peace officers to receive a full year’s pay tax-free—to include local park rangers, community college police, and school district police officers.
8. AB 1245 (D- Monning) - Recovery of Public Records.
Establishes a procedure by which the Secretary of State can recover governmental records, belonging to the state or a local agency that are found in possession of non-governmental entities or persons (for example, a former employee).
9. SB 169 (R- Benoit) - Identification: Honorably Retired Peace Officers.
Empowers the head of a local agency that employs peace officers to bestow upon retirees an honorary badge or other emblem that states that person's position as an honorable retired peace officer from that agency.
10. SB 644 (R- Denham) - Civil Service Examinations: Veterans’ Preference.
Increases the veterans' preference points provided on open, non-promotional state civil service entrance examinations from 10 to 15 points for disabled veterans, and from 5 to 10 points for all other veterans.
1. AB 32 (D-Lieu) - Public officials: Personal Information.
Allows an elected or appointed official, or his or her employer, to obtain an injunction against any person or entity that publicly posts on the Internet the home address or telephone number of that official.
2. AB 381 (D-Block) - Unemployment Compensation Disability Benefits: Academic Employees. Allows community college districts to elect to provide state disability insurance (SDI) coverage to academic employees who are permanent, part-time, or temporary; and, to management, confidential, and employees who are not part of a bargaining unit.
3. AB 485 (D- Carter) - Civil Air Patrol: California Wing: Employment Leave.
Requires an employer to provide 10 days of unpaid leave to an employee called to service by the Civil Air Patrol. (Not just a public sector law)
4. AB 567 (R- Villines) - Government Practices.
Amends the California Whistleblower Protection Act (CWPA) to cover as “employees” those persons appointed to state boards or commissions
5. AB 681 (D- Hernandez) - Confidentiality of Medical Information: Psychotherapy.
Allows for the disclosure of confidential medical information (as opposed to a mere Tarasoff warning) by a psychotherapist when there is a serious imminent threat to the health and safety of a reasonably foreseeable victim or victims. Disclosure must be pursuant to a request for information from law enforcement or the target of the threat (which presumably would include employers and/or employees that are targeted). (Not just a public sector law)
6. AB 955 (D- León) - Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act: Discipline.
Amends the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act to clarify that a public agency is not be required to impose discipline within the one-year limitations period; only the investigation and notice of discipline must be completed within the year.
7. AB 1227 (D- Feuer) - Workers’ Compensation: Public Employees: Leaves of Absence.
Expands the availability of Labor Code 4850 leave—which allows injured peace officers to receive a full year’s pay tax-free—to include local park rangers, community college police, and school district police officers.
8. AB 1245 (D- Monning) - Recovery of Public Records.
Establishes a procedure by which the Secretary of State can recover governmental records, belonging to the state or a local agency that are found in possession of non-governmental entities or persons (for example, a former employee).
9. SB 169 (R- Benoit) - Identification: Honorably Retired Peace Officers.
Empowers the head of a local agency that employs peace officers to bestow upon retirees an honorary badge or other emblem that states that person's position as an honorable retired peace officer from that agency.
10. SB 644 (R- Denham) - Civil Service Examinations: Veterans’ Preference.
Increases the veterans' preference points provided on open, non-promotional state civil service entrance examinations from 10 to 15 points for disabled veterans, and from 5 to 10 points for all other veterans.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
SB 656 Vetoed
Back in May, I wrote about SB 656 (DeSaulnier) which sought to remove from PERB’s jurisdiction any bargaining unit comprised of a majority of peace officers as defined by Penal Code section 830.1. (830.1 officers.). I was partly ambivalent on the bill but opposed to it on the principle that it’s bad public policy to have certain employees covered by PERB and not others. I’m pleased to report that the Governor has vetoed SB 656 for the same reasons. Here is the Governor’s veto message:
“To the Members of the California State Senate:
I am returning Senate Bill 656 without my signature.
While I am supportive of employee rights, this bill would create an inconsistent treatment of non-peace officer employees in unions with peace officer majorities and similar non-peace officer employees that are in unions without a peace officer majority. I do not believe a sufficient case can be made why one group should circumvent the existing dispute resolution process that currently exists through the Public Employment Relations Board. For these reasons, I am unable to sign this bill.
Sincerely,
Arnold Schwarzenegger”
“To the Members of the California State Senate:
I am returning Senate Bill 656 without my signature.
While I am supportive of employee rights, this bill would create an inconsistent treatment of non-peace officer employees in unions with peace officer majorities and similar non-peace officer employees that are in unions without a peace officer majority. I do not believe a sufficient case can be made why one group should circumvent the existing dispute resolution process that currently exists through the Public Employment Relations Board. For these reasons, I am unable to sign this bill.
Sincerely,
Arnold Schwarzenegger”
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